The Effect Good Corporate Governance Mechanism to Firm’s Performance (Empirical Study of Manufacturing Firms Listed on IDX) by Irma, et al.
I J A B E R, Vol. 13, No. 7 (2015): 4849-4866
THE EFFECT OF GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISM TO FIRM’S 
PERFORMANCE (EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS LISTED ON IDX)
Irma, Yeni, Noorina, and H Ali Muktiyanto*
Abstract: This study aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance indicators such 
as the board of directors, audit committee and audit quality on firm’s performance which 
is proxied by Tobinsq and Altman Z Score. This study used manufacturing firms listed in 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange as samples and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was 
used to test the influence of corporate governance indicators on the firm’s performance. 
From the test results found that the higher the commissioners to supervise the firm, the 
better the performance of the firm. As for the indicators of corporate governance, the audit 
committee, also has a positive effect on the performance of the firm. It means that the 
higher the audit committee supervising the firm, the better the performance of the firm. 
Meanwhile, corporate governance indicators of audit quality has a positive relationship 
to the performance of the firm but not significantly, meaning the quality audit of a firm 
doesn’t effect the firm’s performance. This is consistent with previous studies. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm’s Performance, Tobins q, Altman Z 
Score, the Board of Commissioners, the Audit Committee, Audit Quality.
INTRODUCTION
Investors in making investment decisions will conduct an analysis of several 
factors that will determine the prospects assessed its investment in the future. 
The analysis includes fundamental macroeconomic factors such as inflation, 
interest rates and exchange rate. Besides, there are also other factors to consider 
such as political risk, market stability, as well as the legal framework for investor 
protection that would affect the investment climate in a country. Investors also 
need to invest in better information available information on public and privately 
owned information, especially information that is able to change the belief. That 
new information will form a new confidence among investors, especially in the 
capital market.
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Information needed by the investors in the capital market, among others, 
regarding the merger, takeover, stock dividends, and the company’s financial 
statements invested capital. But in recent years, investors also need information 
regarding the implementation of Corporate Governance (CG) in the company.
In the countries in Asia also, the application of the new Corporate Governanve 
started after the financial crisis in various countries in 1997-1998 that begins with 
the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997 and was followed by a crisis in other Asian 
countries that eventually turned into a global financial crisis Asia. The crisis 
occurred as a result of the lack of practice Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
in Asian countries. The failure of some companies and the emergence of cases of 
malpractice in the financial sector due to the alleged practices are the result of poor 
corporate governance (CG).
Basically the principles of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) has the goal to 
give the performance of a company’s progress. OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development cooperation develop a set of corporate governance 
principles, better known as The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
Corporate Governance principles include the principles of transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, independence, and equality or fairness, which 
aims to ensure the survival and growth of sustainable enterprises. These basic 
principles are certainly indispensable in the management of companies in which 
investor confidence into its main components. One of the factors needed to create 
an effective corporate governance, especially after the financial crisis in Asia is 
the role of the board of commissioners as the supervisor in the company. In the 
studies that have been done previously on the effect of the application of corporate 
governance are mixed results on the relationship between the composition of the 
board of management of the company with the company’s performance.
Most studies find evidence of a positive relationship between board size on 
firm performance. As well as research conducted by Abeysekera (2008) against 
the company in Kenya, the number of commissioners who considered effective in 
the range of more than five people and bra of 14 people. Large board size is more 
effective when compared to a small board size (Nasution and Setiawan, 2007; 
and Abeysekera, 2008). And according to Andres, Azofra, and Lopez (2005), the 
number of board members greatly influence the control and supervision activities. 
The larger the board size is expected to supervise the management better. so as to 
improve the performance of the company.
However, several other studies found no effect or a significant relationship 
between the presence of the management board of the company with the company’s 
performance, such as in research Bhagat and Black (1999) and research Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991). Even research Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) found 
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a negative relationship between board size and corporate performance. The 
results are not conclusive is what makes it quite interesting to study in Indonesia 
and should also researched important factors that supported the GCG practices 
primarily affecting the company’s performance. So that the concerns raised in 
this study is how the board, audit committee and audit quality effect on the firm 
performance.
The research objective to be achieved is to provide empirical evidence and 
know in depth on how far the mechanism of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
as characteristic board, audit committee, and audit quality has an influence on 
the level of corporate performance proxied by Tobins Q and Altman Z - Score on 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (Indonesia).
This research is expected to benefit the company or management to obtain 
an overview of the essential components of good corporate governance and the 
application of essential characteristics possessed by GCG in order to see the 
implications on the performance and health of companies, especially companies 
in the manufacturing industry.
THEORITICAL REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Corporate Governance Theories
According Siebens (2002), corporate governance is the science and art of balancing 
the distribution of the interests of all stakeholders and make a choice among a 
variety of options to support any kind of information to be a responsible company. 
Also according to Suta (2000), “corporate governance refers to the set of rulesapplicable 
to the direction and control of a company. 
So that corporate governance is a set of rules that can be applied to the purpose 
and corporate control. The agency theory is difficult to apply and many obstacles 
and still is not enough, so we need a clearer concept of the protection of the 
stakeholders, the issues relating to conflicts of interest and agency costs that will 
arise, so it develops a new concept observe and regulate the interests of the parties 
with respect to the ownership and pengoperasionalan company known for the 
concept of corporate governance.
Definition of Good Corporate Governance
According FCGI (2001) notion of good corporate governance is a set of rules 
governing the relationship between shareholders, management (management) 
companies, creditors, government, employees and internal stakeholders and 
other esktern relating to the rights and obligations or the other words, a system 
that regulates and controls the company. While the Cadbury Committee is a set 
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of rules that define the relationship between shareholders, managers, creditors, 
government, employees, and those other stakeholders both internally and 
externally in relation to their rights and their responsibilities.
According Rahmawati et al (2006), Good Corporate Governance is defined 
as a set of rules and principles such as fairness, transparency, accountability, and 
responsibility, which governs the relationship between the shareholders, the 
management, the company (directors and commissioners), creditors, employees 
and stakeholders other relating to the rights and obligations of each party. Based on 
the definition or understanding of good corporate governance in the above it can 
be concluded that, in essence good corporate governance is the system, processes, 
and a set of rules governing the relationship between the various interested parties 
(stakeholders), especially in the narrow sense, namely the relationship between 
the shareholders, the board of commissioners, and the board of directors for the 
achievement of corporate objectives.
While the goal of good corporate governance is to create added value for 
stakeholders. Theoretically, GCG can increase the value of the company, by 
improving their financial performance, which may reduce the risk undertaken by 
the board of commissioners with decisions that benefit themselves and generally 
good corporate governance can increase investor confidence (Tjager et al., 2003).
Based on these definitions can be drawn a conclusion that corporate governance 
is essentially a system, process, and a set of rules governing the relationship 
between the various interested parties (stakeholders), especially in the narrow 
sense of the relationship between shareholders, board of commissioners, and 
the board of directors for the achievement of corporate objectives. Corporate 
governance is intended to manage these relationships and to prevent significant 
errors in corporate strategy and to ensure that the errors that occur can be corrected 
immediately.
Corporate Governance Principles
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a 
set of corporate governance principles, or better known as The OECD Principles 
Of Corporate Governance. The basic principles of good corporate governance 
include: 
1. Transparency (disclosure of information), namely transparency in the 
decision making process and openness in expressing material and relevant 
information about the company.
2. Accountability (accountability), the clarity of function, structure, systems, 
and corporate accountability so that organs are effective enterprise 
management.
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3. Responsibility (accountability), ie conformity (compliance) in the manage-
ment of the firm to the principles of healthy corporate and applicable 
legislation.
4. Independency (autonomy), which is a state where a professionally 
managed company with no conflict of interest and influence or pressure 
from management that is not in accordance with regulations and legislation 
in force and the principles of healthy corporate. 
5. Fairness (equality and fairness), the fair and equal treatment in meeting 
stakeholder rights arising under the agreement and applicable legislation.
(Kaihatu, 2006).
Corporate Governance Mechanism
The principles of corporate governance as described above is realized in the 
management of the company attempted to implement the following matters: 
1. General Meeting of Shareholders 
2. Openness and Transparency 
3. The presence of independent commissioner.
4. BOC size
5. Audit Committee 
6. Ownership Structure
LITERATURE REVIEW
1. The Effect of Commissioners Board to Firm Performance
The studies that have been done previously on the importance of the implementation 
of corporate governance, especially in the case studies conducted by other 
countries, used the term to describe the board of directors oversight function. Such 
as one of the studies referenced in this research is research conducted by Pathan 
(2007), which examines the size and independence of the board of directors and its 
influence on the company’s performance on a bank in Thailand.
Results of this study indicate that board size smaller would be more effective in 
monitoring corporate managers, while the board with a larger size are more prone 
to agency problems between the owner and the company that runs the company’s 
operations (management). Research Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also suggests 
that councils with a smaller size would be more effective and can provide added 
value because it is easier to coordinate in it.
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But Kiel and Nicholson (2003) found a significant positive relationship between 
the size of corporate boards and firm performance among Australian companies 
are great. It is also supported by research conducted by Abeysekera (2008) against 
the company in Kenya which states that the number of commissioners who 
considered effective in the range of more than 5 and less than 14 people. Large 
board size is more effective than a small board (Nasution and Setiawan, 2007), and 
Abeysekera (2008). Meanwhile, according to Andres, Azofra, and Lopez (2005) the 
number of board members greatly influence the control and supervision activities 
larger the board size is expected to supervise the better management so as to 
improve the performance of the company.
Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2007) concluded there is a significant 
positive effect between the proportion of independent directors with banking 
performance. Hadrat (2009) also examined the relationship CG index IICG study 
results in 2003, 2004, and 2005 and the company’s operational performance. 
Measure of operational performance in-proxy-kan with Profit Margin, ROA, 
ROE, and ROI. Used as a control variable composition perusaah assets, growth 
opportunities, and firm size. To examine the relationship used multiple linear 
regression models. In contrast to research Klapper and Love (2002) and Darmawati, 
et al (2005), the results of this study do not provide evidence of a positive and 
significant relationship between the application of CG and firm performance. 
These results may be influenced by the limited number of samples using only 22 
companies included in the top 10 rankings of IICG.
However, several other studies have found no relationship between board 
independence on firm performance or even bank there are few studies that found 
a negative relationship between board independence and corporate performance 
such as research Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and the research Filatotchev, Lien and 
Piesse (2005) which states that the independent commissioner negatively affect 
the performance of the company. Various studies conducted showed that there 
are significant results of independent directors on firm performance (both positive 
and negative).
2. The Effect of Audit Committee to Firm Performance
Another important component of the component that supports the implementation 
of good corporate governance, the audit committee (FCGI, 2001).In accordance 
with the Decision of the Chairman of Bapepam Number: kep.29/PM/2004, the 
audit committee is a committee established by the board of commissioners to 
carry out the task of supervision and management of the company. Research 
conducted by Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) found that the audit committee is 
an important factor in the control of management. In that study, the average audit 
committee which is owned by the sample companies are 5 members in the range 
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of 2 to 12 members. Number of audit committee members influence the level of 
influence that can be given to the company, the size of the larger audit committees 
are expected to keep the bank with better performance.
While the study examined the effect of audit committee members are 
independent of the performance of the company or bank by Nasution and 
Setiawan (2007) and Li et al (2008). From the results of their study revealed that 
audit committee members are independent positive effect on firm performance. 
With the independent audit committee is expected to improve the company’s 
performance.
3. The Effect of Audit Quality to Firm Performance
Audit is a systematic process to obtain and evaluate the evidence objectively, 
related to assertions of economic measures to measure the level of correspondence 
between the assertions with established criteria and then communicating the results 
to the parties concerned (Kell, 2001). Results of the audit process is the auditor’s 
report (audit opinion), which is a report on the fairness of financial statements 
in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted. Audit will reduce 
the information asymmetry between company management and stakeholders by 
allowing outsiders to verify the validity of the financial statements. Kinney and 
Martin (1994) examined nine studies and found that the audit reduces the positive 
bias of the earnings and net assets before audited.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
Based on the analysis of previous studies and the hypothesis in this study is 
expressed as follows: 
H1: The Board of Commissioners has an influence on the performance of the 
company.
H2: The audit committee has an influence on the performance of the company
H3: Audit quality has an influence on the performance of the company.
RESEARCH METHODS
Research Model 
To determine the effect of the independent variables Commissioners, the Audit 
Committee and Audit Quality on the dependent variable firm performance (Tobins 
Q and the Altman Z-Score) then set up a model of the Structural Equation Model 
(SEM) to test the hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 3. Meanwhile, for the measurement 
model in this study using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) which indicates 
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a latent variable measured by one or more observed variables. In this case it is 
a latent variable that is measured while the company performance observed 
variables used to measure company performance variables are variables Board 
of Trustees, Audit Committee, and Audit Quality. Then the research model using 
CFA are as follows:
Size of Commisoiners Board
Meeting of Commisioners Board
Independent Commisioners Portion
Size of Audit Committee
Independent Audit Committee Portion
Meeting of Audit Committee
Working Experience as An Auditor
Educational Background of Audit Committee
External Audit 
Audit Opinion
Board of Commisioners
Audit Committtee
Audit Quality 
Firm”s Performance
Tobins Q
Altman Z-Score
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
Latent Variables
Latent variable in this study is the Board of Commissioners, the Audit Committee, 
Audit Quality, and Firm Performance. Board of commissioners, in the path 
diagram shortened to dekom. This variable is measured using three variables: 
dekom 1, dekom 2, and dekom3. Audit Committee, inthe path diagram shortened 
to KOMDIT. This variable was measured by using 5 variables: KOMDIT 1, 
KOMDIT 2, KOMDIT 3, KOMDIT 4, and KOMDIT5. Audit Quality, in the path 
diagram is shortened to KUADIT. This variable is measured using two variables: 
KUADIT KUADIT 1 and KUADIT 2. Company’s performance, in the path diagram 
shortened to KUAFIRM. This variable is measured using two variables: KUAFIRM 
1, and KUAFIRM 2.
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Observed Variables
Variables observed in this study consisted of 12 variables consisting of: 
1. Three observed variables of Dekom. Dekom 1 measured using board size, 
Dekom 2 measured using the proportion of independent directors, and 
Dekom 3 was measured by using a number of meetings held by the board 
of commissioners for 1 year.
2. Five observed variables of Komdit.  KOMDIT 1 was measured by using the 
number of audit committee, KOMDIT 2 measured using the proportion of 
independent audit committee, KOMDIT 3 measured using the number of 
audit committee meetings, KOMDIT 4 measured using audit committee 
members’ experience working as an auditor, and measured using a 5 
KOMDIT background education audit committee
3. Two observed variables OF kuadit. KUADIT 1 was measured by using a 
dummy the size of the Public Accounting Firm (KAP) conduct an audit 
of the companies sampled in this study. If the companies audited by Big 
4 accounting firm (KAP big) then high audit quality, but if the companies 
audited by non-Big 4 accounting firm (KAP small) then the lower the 
audit quantity. KUADIT 2 was measured by using a dummy of the audit 
opinion provided by the external auditor. Value of 1 if the audit opinion is 
unqualified obtained (WTP), whereas if the audit opinion obtained WTP 
has a value other than 0.
4. Two variables are observed KUAFIRM. KUAFIRM 1 was measured by 
using the Tobins Q. KUAFIRM 2 was measured by using the Altman 
Z-Score
Method of Data Collecting
The data used in this research is secondary data, such as annual reports and 
financial statements of companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) in 
2011-2012. Datais collecting from official site BEI (www. Idx.co.id), and the official 
website of each company. Data of the board of directors and audit committees 
derived from annual report companies, annual reports from 2011 until 2012. 
While the data of Tobins Q and Altman Z-Score (to measure the performance of 
companies) is collecting from the financial statements of the firms from 2011 until 
2012 and OSIRIS data.
Sample Selection Method
Unit analysis of this study is a manufacturing company. While the population of 
this research is all companies in the field of manufacturing industries listed in the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange(BEI) in 2011-2012.
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Hypothesis Testing
Testing in the study following the steps that apply in SEM by using maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE). According to Hair et. al. (1998), evaluation of the 
degree of fit to the model is done through several stages, namely:
zz Compatibility overall model (overall model fit)
zz Compatibility measurement model (measurement model fit)
zz Compatibility structural model (structural model fit)
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on data in Table 1, the descriptive statistics for each variable in this study 
are as follows:
1. Average Dekom 1 as measured by board size is as much as 3 people. While 
minimum is 3 and maximum is 8 people.
2. Average Dekom 2 as measured by the proportion of independent directors 
is 0,54 means the number of independent board members compared to 
the number of commissioners has the same proportions. While minimum 
Dekom 2 is 0567, and maximum is 0.78.
3. Average Dekom 3 as measured by the number of board meetings is 11 
meetings a year and it is equal to the number of meetings required by the 
government, while minimum is 4 means that the company is only held 
meetings 4 times in a year while the maximum value is 43, means there is 
a company that held a meeting in a year as many as 42 times. This is more 
of that required by the government.
4. Average Komdit 1 were measured using a number of audit committee is 
4 means that on average most companies have audit committee members 
(external and internal), while the minimum is at 3 meaning that there is a 
company that has three audit committee members. While the maximum 
number Komdit is at 6 means that there is a company that has 6 audit 
committee members.
5. On average Komdit 2 as measured using the proportion of independent 
audit committee is of 0.5 means the number of independent audit 
compared the number of audit committee members as a whole have the 
same proportion. While the minimum value is 0,677 means the number 
of audit committee members compared with the number of independent 
members of the audit committee as a whole has a smaller proportion or 
less. While the maximum value of 0.77 means the number of independent 
audit committee members compared to the number of audit committee 
members as a whole have nearly the same proportion.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
dekom1 81 3.00 8.00 3.0000 .98742
dekom2 81 .54 .78 .5670 .75051
dekom3 81 4.00 42.00 11.00 .83629
komdit1 81 3.00 6.00 4.0000 .94868
komdit2 81 .677 .770 .5000 .94002
komdit3 81 3.00 15.00 13.0000 .66967
komdit4 81 .00 .67 .3300 .94002
komdit5 81 .00 .69 .3400 1.01120
kuadit1 81 .00 1.00 .6000 .35746
kuadit2 81 .00 1.00 .6000 .39087
Tobinsq 81 1.50 3.00 1.7037 .88663
altmanz 81 1.00 3.00 1.6049 .68336
Valid N (listwise) 81
6. Average Komdit 3 as measured using the number of meetings of the audit 
committee is 13 times in one year, while meeting minimum is 3 times in a year 
while maximum is 16 times in excess of that required by the government.
7. On average Komdit 4 as measured using the working experience as an 
auditor of the audit committee members are 0,33 means that the average 
member of the audit committee who has a background in accounting 
education is 1/3 of the total number of members of the audit committee as a 
whole. The minimum is 0,00 meaning no audit committee members in the 
sample companies have the educational background of accounting. While 
it is the maximum value is 0.67 means that the number of audit committee 
members who have the educational background of accounting 67% of the 
total number of members of the audit committee as a whole.
8. The average Komdit 5 are measured using the educational background of 
the audit committee is 0,34 means that the average member of the audit 
committee who has experience as an auditor is 1/3 of the total number of 
members of the audit committee as a whole. While the minimum value 
is 0 meaning no audit committee members in the sample companies that 
have experience as an auditor. The maximum value is 0.690 means that the 
number of audit committee members who have experience as an auditor 
for 69% of the total number of members of the audit committee as a whole.
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9. On average Kuadit 1 as measured using the dummy variable of the size of 
the Public Accounting Firm (KAP) which conduct an audit of banks into 
the sample amounted to 0.60 means that 60% of the companies sampled in 
this study audited by KAP Big Four and 40 % remaining Non audited by 
KAP Big Four.
10. Average Kuadit 2 were measured using a dummy variable of audit opinion 
is 0.60 means that 60% of the companies obtain audit opinion “unqualified” 
of the external auditor. The remaining 40% get audit opinion other than 
“unqualified”. 
Stages and Testing Results
1. Suitability of Overall Model: SEM analysis of the structural model 
incompatibility testing begins with the overall model that is seen by the 
indicators Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) statistics of output LISREL(Hair et al., 
1995). Overall summary of the critical value of the overall suitability testing 
model can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2 
The Result of Suitability Test of Overall Model
Suitabilitity 
Model Criteria
Suitability Level Indicator Estimation 
Model Result
Suitability 
Model Level
RMSEA
P (close fit)
RMSEA < 0,08
P < 0.05
0,070
0.042
Good fit 
Good fit
ECVI Smaller values of Independence and closer 
to the Saturated Model
M* = 1.74
S** = 1.95
I*** = 16.14
Good fit
AIC Smaller values of Independence and closer 
to the Saturated Model
M* = 139.10
S** = 156.00
I*** = 1291.32
Good fit
CAIC Smaller values of Independence and closer 
to the Saturated Model
M* = 240.93
S** = 420.77
I*** = 1332.05
Good fit
NFI NFI > 0,90 0.94 Good fit
NNFI NNFI > 90 0,96 Good fit
CFI CFI > 0,90 0,97 Good fit
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IFI IFI > 0,90 0,97 Good fit
RFI RFI > 0,90 0,91 Good fit
RMR Standardized RMR < 0.05 0.026 Good fit
GFI GFI >0,90, good fit; 0.90 < GFI > 0.80, marginal 
fit
0,86 Marginal fit
 By looking at the over all results of the estimation based on existing criteria, 
the overall obtained good grades fit. So that the results of an analysis of the 
reliability of the overall output for models testing in good fit.
2. Suitability of Measurement Model: Sustainability of model measurements 
were performed separately for each construct through evaluation of the 
construct validity and reliability (Wijanto, 2006). This testing phase aims to 
ensure that the constructs used in this study meet the criteria of valid and 
reliable. The level of validity and reliability of each construct of observed 
variable scan be seen in Table 3. Based on the data in the table it can be 
concluded that  the standard factor loading of each variable observed greater 
than 0.70 then the validity of each variable is good. Meanwhile, if viewed from 
the variance extracted all variables observed were greater than 0:50, it can be 
said that each variable has a good level of reliability.
Table 3 
Validity and Reliability Model List
No Variable Observed SLF Error T-value Description
1. Tobins Q 0.840 0.097 3.890  Good Validity and Reliability
2. Altmanz 0.640 0.095 6.730  Good Validity and Reliability
3. Dekom 1 0.970 0.080 12.21  Good Validity and Reliability
4. Dekom 2 0.630 0.610 0.913  Good Validity and Reliability
5. Dekom 3 0.790 0.370 0.945  Good Validity and Reliability
6. Komdit 1 0.940 0.076 12.31  Good Validity and Reliability 
7. Komdit 2 0.930 0.075 12.28  Good Validity and Reliability 
8. Komdit 3 0.550 0.061 8.910  Good Validity and Reliability 
9. Komdit 4 0.910 0.077 11.83  Good Validity and Reliability 
10. Komdit 5 0.980 0.083 11.84  Good Validity and Reliability 
11. Kuadit 1 0.450 0.150 2.960  Good Validity and Reliability 
12. Kuadit 2 0.270 0.100 2.160  Good Validity and Reliability 
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3. Compatibility of Structural Model: The analysis was carried out on the 
structural equation coefficients by specifying certain level of significance. 
Analysis of this structural model to test the hypothesis proposed in this study. 
For a significance level of 0.05, the value t of structural equation must be greater 
or equal to 1.96 or greater for practical purposes equal to 2 (Wijanto, 2008).
4. Structural Equation Model: Structural equation model to prove the H1, H2, 
and H3 are as follows: 
KUAFIRM = dekom+0:250:27**KOMDIT+0073*KUADIT, 
Errorvar. =0.83, R ²=0:16  
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)  
2.39 2.10 0.58 4.39
From the equation above in the structural model can be seen in the numbers 
at the bottom, all the coefficients have significant t values, except for the latent 
variables Quality Audit (KUADIT). This equation is an equation for the hypothesis 
first, second and third. It can be concluded that the hypothesis in this study is to 
H1 and H2 results proved significant. As for H3 results proved insignificant.
Not proven the hypothesis significance to 2, it can be proven from descriptive 
statistics on variables external audit firms sampled. More than 60% of the companies 
sampled in the audit by the Big Four while remaining in the audit by the external 
audit of non big four. What it means is, although not in the big four audit by the 
firm will not affect the company’s performance. And from descriptive statistics 
shows that the 60% sample companies get about WTP (unqualified), while the 
rest get outside opinion WTP.To assess how well the coefficient of determination 
of structural equation, will be seen from the amount of R2 (Wijanto, 2006). Lisrel 
test results that can be seen in the Reduced Form Equation R2 values  obtained 
for structural equation in this study. R2 value in this research model is at 0,16, 
which means this model can only explain 16% of the change in the latent variable 
firm performance. Overall value t of the three hypotheses proposed in this study 
results can be summarized in Table 4 below:
Table 4 
Values t-value for each hypothesis
Hypothesis Path Estimation t-value Conclusion
1 DEKOM KUAFIRM 0.27 2.39 Significant
2 KOMDITKUAFIRM 0.25 2.10 Significant
3 KUADIT KUAFIRM 0.073 0.58 Not Significant
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Results path diagram in  Figure 3  below, shows the structural model generated 
from the out putlisrel.
Analysis of Test Results
Based on structural equation model produced, confirming that the commissioners 
proved significantly positive effect on company performance. This means that 
greater over sight is conducted by the board of directors on the company’s 
operations, the higher the performance generated by the company. The results of 
this study reinforce the results of previous studies that Rosentein and Wyatt(1990), 
Daltonetal (1999), Nasution and Setiawan (2007), and Abeysekera (2008).
The second hypothesis which examines the effect of the audit committee of the 
company’s performance also proved a significant positive result. Means the greater 
the performance of the functions of the audit committee on audit operations of the 
company, the higher the performance generated by the company terse but. Hasil 
reinforces previous research that Herwidayatmo (2000), Xie, Davids on and DaDalt 
(2003), and Abeysekera (2008). The third hypothesis that evaluated the effects of 
aquality audit of the company’s performance results have proven positive, but not 
significantly. Meaning is a quality audit of a company, the better the performance 
generated by the company. These results reinforce the results of previous studies 
such as research Jensen and Meckling(1976), and Watts and Zimmerman (1986).
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CONCLUSION
1.	 This research is motivated by previous studies conducted related to the 
effect of the application of corporate governance on corporate performance. 
The purpose of this study was to see how far the application of corporate 
governance can be good or bad effect on the company’s performance. This 
model uses the data 81 companies belonging to the manufacturing industry.
2.	 Hypothesis 1 is to test whether the board of directors as one of the indicators in the 
corporate governance affect the company’s performance proved significantly 
and look at the output results of structural equations with positive estimated 
value which means commissioners positive effect on the performance of the 
bank. The better the performance of the board of commissioners, the better the 
performance of the banking system.
3.	 Hypothesis 2 that tests whether the audit committee as one of the indicators 
in the corporate governance affect the performance of the company, proved a 
significant effect, and look at the output results of structural equations with 
positive estimation value means a positive effect on the audit committee of 
the company’s performance. The better the performance of the board of 
commissioners, the better the performance of the company.
4.	 Hypothesis 3 that test whether audit quality as one of the indicators in the 
corporate governance affect the performance of the company, the results 
are evident and visible on the output results of structural equations with 
positive estimation value means the positive effect of the audit committee 
on the performance of the bank. The better the performance of the board of 
commissioners, the better the performance of the banking system. However, 
this effect was not significant.
Suggestion
Based on these results it is expected that in future studies to increase the number 
of samples and widens years of observation (firm years) and add a variable 
incorporate governance suspected of having an influence on the performance of 
the company. By entering these variables can be expected research results more in 
line with the facts on the ground.
Limitations Research
This study has the limitations, namely in terms of the number of respondents who 
used a bit so it can not be tested by the method of weighted least square (WLS) 
which is likely to give different results. In addition it has not done respesifikasi to 
this research model.
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